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WASHINGTON CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT-
PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE PRIVATE
LITIGANT
Under Washington's Consumer Protection Act,1 a private individual
has standing to sue2 for unfair or deceptive business practices. The private
litigant may not, however, use the Act as a vehicle to remedy those
wrongs that impact only the private individual, 3 because the Act's de-
clared purpose is to protect the public interest.4 The public interest re-
quirement thus imposes a restriction on the otherwise liberal construction
of the Act. 5 The Washington Supreme Court has established two tests by
which the public interest requirement may be met: (1) the per se test6 and
(2) the Anhold v. Daniels test. 7
I. BACKGROUND
The court first construed the legislative grant of a private remedy in
Lightfoot v. MacDonald.8 The court narrowed the potential scope of the
private litigant's remedy 9 by holding that a prerequisite to such a remedy
1. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.020 (1984) declares unlawful "[u]nfair methods of competition
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce."
2. Id. § 19.86.090(1984).
3. Lightfoot v. MacDonald, 86 Wn. 2d 331, 333, 544 P.2d 88, 89 (1976) (it is not the purpose of
the Act "to provide an additional remedy for private wrongs which do not affect the public gener-
ally").
4. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (1984) ("It is, however, the intent of the legislature that this
act shall not be construed to prohibit acts or practices which . . . are not injurious to the public
interest.").
5. Lightfoot, 86 Wn. 2d at 334, 544 P.2d at 90. Although the Act on its face requires only that
plaintiff prove injury, the court imposes a requirement that plaintiff also prove that defendant's acts
affect the public interest. See also Anhold v. Daniels, 94 Wn. 2d 40, 614 P.2d 184 (1980) (relying on
Lightfoot to impose a public interest requirement).
6. The state supreme court stated the elements of the per se test in Salois v. Mutual of Omaha, 90
Wn. 2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978). The elements are: "(1) is the action illegal, i.e., is it unlawful?
and (2) is it against public policy as declared by the legislature or the judiciary?" Id. at 358, 581 P.2d
at 1351. For a discussion of the per se test, see infra notes 25-53 and accompanying text.
7. The public interest test developed by the court in Anhold v. Daniels, 94 Wn. 2d 40, 614 P.2d
184 (1980) is
(1) the defendant by unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce has
induced the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting; (2) the plaintiff suffers damage brought about
by such action or failure to act; and (3) the defendant's deceptive acts or practices have the
potential for repetition.
Id. at 46, 614 P.2d at 188. For a discussion of the Anhold test, see infra notes 54-67 and accompany-
ing text.
8. 86 Wn. 2d 331, 544 P.2d 88 (1976) (plaintiff's claim of legal malpractice not a violation of
the Consumer Protection Act).
9. See Note, Private Suits Under Washington's Consumer Protection Act: The Public Interest
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was a showing that the conduct complained of would be "vulnerable to a
complaint by the Attorney General," 10 that is, the conduct affects the
"public interest." I I
The public interest restriction reflected the basic position that not every
unfair or deceptive act in the conduct of trade or commerce affects the
public, thereby giving rise to a cause of action under the Act. 12 Beyond
this, however, a more elaborate justification for the requirement exists. 13
First, the purpose section of the Act clearly limits the Act's application to
only those practices that injure the public interest. 14 Second, the context
in which the Consumer Protection Act was passed demonstrates that the
goal of the Act was only to limit those actions that presented a substantial
hazard to the public, rather than to limit isolated transactions. '5 Finally,
the legislative goal of the 1970 amendment 16 creating a private right of
action under the Act was to insure more effective enforcement' 7 within
the context of the marketplace. 18 Therefore, the primary purpose for pro-
viding a private cause of action for unfair and deceptive acts was to pro-
tect the public from a "generalized course of conduct"1 9 without over-
regulation of the state's businesses. 20 In order to effectuate this policy,
the court in Lightfoot properly concluded that a restrictive public interest
requirement was necessary. In so holding, however, the court did not in-
dicate a criterion that would define the public interest and thereby stan-
dardize the determination of when an injury to a private party would con-
stitute a threat to the public interest. 21
Requirement, 54 WASH L. REv. 795 (1979); Comment, Attempts to Restrict Actionable Conduct Pur-
suant to Washington's Consumer Protection Act, 12 GONz L. REV. 621 (1977).
10. 86 Wn. 2d at 334,544 P.2d at 90.
11. Id.
12. Id. ("A breach of a private contract affecting no one but the parties to the contract ... is not
an act or practice affecting the public interest.").
13. See Note, supra note 9, at 801-08.
14. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (1984).
15. See Note, supra note 9, at 804, 805 (consumer and legislative concern over questionable
marketing practices, such as "bait and switch" advertising, free gimmick sales, and "fear-sell,"
which presented threats to the public at large).
16. Act of Feb. 20, 1970, ch. 26, § 2, 1970 Wash. Laws 203 (codified as amended at WASH.
REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (1984)).
17. See Lightfoot, 86 Wn. 2d at 334, 544 P.2d at 90.
18. For a general discussion, see Anhold v. Daniels, 94 Wn. 2d 40, 45, 614 P.2d 184, 187-88
(1980).
19. See Eastlake Const. Co. v. Hess, 102 Wn. 2d 30, 51, 686 P.2d 465,476 (1984).
20. See Note, supra note 9, at 805.
21. Anhold, 94 Wn. 2d at 45, 614 P.2d at 187 ("Neither the legislature nor this court, in Light-
foot or elsewhere, has otherwise formulated criteria for determining when a private suit may be
brought under the act.").
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II. THE PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD TODAY
The Washington Supreme Court resolved the problem created by
Lightfoot by developing the per se test22 and the Anhold test. 23 Compli-
ance with either of these tests guarantees the effectuation of the underly-
ing purpose of the Act, as declared by the supreme court, which is solely
the protection of the public interest. 24
A. The Per Se Test
The per se test involves two issues: (1) is the action illegal? and (2) is it
against public policy as declared by the legislature or the judiciary? 25 The
supreme court stated the per se test in Salois v. Mutual of Omaha.26 In
Salois the trial court found that the defendant insurance company had
breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing.27 The supreme court held
that in so doing the defendants had not only violated a statute regulating
insurance28 but had also acted against public policy, thereby violating the
Consumer Protection Act.29 To reach this conclusion the court relied on
the declaration of public interest clearly contained within the statute. 30
After Salois a question emerged that centered on when the judiciary
could construe a statute as containing a declaration of public interest. 3' In
Haner v. Quincy Farm Chemicals, Inc.,32 the supreme court settled the
issue by tightening the interpretation of what could constitute a legislative
22. See supra note 6 & infra notes 25-53 and accompanying text.
23. See supra note 7 & infra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
24. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
25. Salois v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 90 Wn. 2d 355, 358, 581 P.2d 1349, 1351 (1978)
(relying on State v. Readers Digest Ass'n, 81 Wn. 2d 258, 501 P.2d 290 (1972)); see supra note 6.
26. 90 Wn. 2d 355,581 P.2d 1349(1978).
27. Id. at357,581 P.2dat 1350.
28. WASH. REv. CODE § 48.01.030 (1984) requires anyone involved in the insurance business to
deal fairly and in good faith.
29. 90 Wn. 2d at 359, 581 P.2d at 1351; WASH. REv. CODE § 48.01.030 (1984). This does not
mandate that a violation of that statute constitutes a violation of the Consumer Protection Act. If such
a mandate were present, the illegal act clearly would be against public policy, and would violate the
Consumer Protection Act per se. For examples of such a mandate, see id. §§ 19.16.440 (governing
collection agencies), 46.71.070 (governing automotive repair).
30. Salois, 90 Wn. 2d at 359 & n.1, 581 P.2d at 1351 & n.l (relying on statute's language that
"[t]he business of insurance is one affected by the public interest").
31. Compare Nuttall v. Dowell, 31 Wn. App. 98, 639 P.2d 832 (1982) (holding that the regula-
tion and licensing provisions of WASH. REv. CODE § 18.85 were designed to protect public interest
even though there was no specific legislative declaration) with Symposium, A Real Estate Broker's
Duty to His Purchaser: Washington State's Position and Some Projections for the Future, 17 GONZ.
L. REv. 79, 115 (1981) (author declines to find legislative declaration in § 18.85 since intent not
specifically stated); see also Comment, The Developing Law of Consumer Protection. 10 GONZ. L.
REv. 79 (1975).
32. 97 Wn. 2d 753, 649 P.2d 828 (1982).
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declaration of public interest. The court rejected the argument that any
violation of a valid state statute in the conduct of trade or commerce is a
per se violation, 33 requiring instead "a 'specific legislative declaration' of
a public interest.' '34 This rule prevents a court from inferring that a par-
ticular statute relates to the public interest. 35 The rule also standardizes
the per se test to insure consistent results through the preservation of the
two-step analysis of Salois. 36
The ruling in Haner is proper in light of the underlying justification of
the public interest requirement. 37 The court recognized that a specific leg-
islative declaration is assurance that a particular practice has been noted
by the legislature as a danger to the public interest. This holding elimi-
nates the possibility that a legislative declaration could be manufactured
without the proper legislative intent.
In the period between Salois and Haner the court of appeals attempted
to provide some guidance on the problem of when a sufficient legislative
declaration of public interest is present. In Dempsey i. Pignataro Che'ro-
let, 38 the court formulated a four-step test: (1) existence of a "pertinent
statute", (2) its violation, (3) causation, and (4) that the plaintiff was a
member of the class the statute was intended to protect. 39 While this stan-
dard was relied upon by the lower courts, it did not help to create predic-
tability in the determination of the presence of a legislative declaration.40
The Haner decision forced a modification of the Dempsey test, as dem-
onstrated by Crane & Crane v. C & D Electric.4 1 In Crane & Crane, the
court of appeals equated the "pertinent statute" requirement of Dempsey
with the "specific legislative declaration" of Haner, and held that there
must be a specific legislative declaration before a statute could be consid-
ered pertinent. 42 This holding clearly restates Dempsey in light of Haner
and casts doubt on the Dempsey test.
The current status of the Dempsey test is weakened by a number of
factors. It was limited from its inception by its failure to clarify which
33. Id. at 762, 649 P.2d at 833. The rejected argument was based on dicta in State v. Ralph
Williams' N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 87 Wn. 2d 298. 324 n. 19, 553 P.2d 423. 440 n. 19(1976).
34. Haer, 97 Wn. 2d at 762,649 P.2d at 833.
35. The rule thus limits the courts' ability to make judicial pronouncements of public policy. See
infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
37. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
38. 22 Wn. App. 384. 589 P.2d 1265 (1978).
39. Id. at 393, 589 P.2d at 1270.
40. See Saint Paul Ins. Co. v. Updegrave, 33 Wn. App. 653, 656 P.2d 1130 (1983): Hangman
Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 33 Wn. App. 129. 652 P.2d 962 (1982):
Lidstrand v. Silvercrest Industries. 28 Wn. App. 359. 623 P.2d 710 (1981).
41. 37Wn.App.560,683P.2d 1103(1984).
42. Id. at 565,683 P.2d at 1107.
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statute contained a legislative declaration of public policy. Rather, the
Dempsey requirement did nothing more than restate the problem. More-
over, it ignored the possibility of the judicial declaration of public policy,
which Salois allowed. 43 Thus to apply the test is only to increase the
checklist without illuminating those matters that impact the public inter-
est.
One question that the court did not address in Haner was whether a
judicial declaration of public policy could still comply with the second
step of the per se test. The court said nothing about a judicial declaration
in Haner,44 nor did it incorporate such a possibility within the framework
provided by Anhold.45 Rather, in each case the court advocated the use of
the public interest test of Anhold when there was "no direct legislative
declaration.' '46 The court of appeals in Dempsey47 and Crane48 also made
no mention of a judicial declaration in their discussion of the per se test.
Nevertheless, the supreme court in the recent case of Sato v. Century 2149
indicated that a judicial declaration of public policy can satisfy the second
element of the Salois test, but that "compelling reasons" 50 are necessary
for such a declaration.
In light of these developments it is likely that a judicial pronouncement
of public policy would be used only in the limited situation in which there
was no legislative declaration and the elements of Anhold could not be
met. Moreover, such a pronouncement should only be made in a case
where the public interest was not sufficiently protected by other remedies
provided by law. 51 Haner demonstrates that a remedy for a per se
43. See supra note 6.
44. 97 Wn. 2d 753, 649 P.2d 828 (1982).
45. See supra note 7; infra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
46. Anhold, 94 Wn. 2d at 43, 614 P.2d at 187; Haner, 97 Wn. 2d at 762, 649 P.2d at 833.
47. 22 Wn. App. 384, 589 P.2d 1265 (1978).
48. 37 Wn. App. at 565,683 P.2d at 1107.
49. 101 Wn. 2d 599, 681 P.2d 242 (1984).
50. Id. at 602, 681 P.2d at 244 (court acknowledged the power to declare public policy but could
"discern no compelling reasons... to establish a public policy prohibiting the practice in this iso-
lated transaction").
51. Such a case is most likely to arise in an area of law traditionally under the state supreme
court's control, such as the unauthorized practice of law. No such judicial declaration of public policy
emerged, however, from the two cases in which the courts of this state have dealt with the unauthor-
ized practice of law as a violation of the Consumer Protection Act. See Bowers v. Transamerica Title
Ins. Co., 100 Wn. 2d 581, 675 P.2d 193 (1983); Hangman Ridge Training Stable, Inc., v. Safeco
Title Ins. Co., 33 Wn. App. 129, 652 P.2d 962 (1982). Still, considering the supreme court's state-
ment that the unauthorized practice of law concerns the public interest, Washington State Bar Assoc.
v. Great Western Union Fed'l Savings & Loan Assoc., 91 Wn. 2d 48, 61,586 P.2d 870, 878 (1978),
and the supreme court's leadership in the policing of the practice of law, Hagan v. Kassler Escrow,
Inc., 96 Wn. 2d 443, 635 P.2d 730 (1981), it is possible that the court may add the Consumer
Protection Act to its enforcement mechanism. And the recent holding that the application of the CPA
to entrepeneural aspects of the practice of law does not interfere with the constitutional power of the
court. Short and Cressman v. Demopolis, No. 49617-0 (Wash. Nov. 6, 1984). It is possible that the
205
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violation under the Consumer Protection Act should not be added unless
the legislature has opened the door by declaring that the public interest is
involved. 52 The corollary to this rule is that a judicial declaration should
not add a remedy that the legislature was presumably unwilling to adopt,
because such action would be inconsistent with the restriction the Haner
court placed on liberal construction, and would yield unpredictable re-
sults. 53
B. The Anhold Test
The alternative to a per se violation is to establish impact to the public
interest by showing that the defendant's acts induced the plaintiff to act,
that the plaintiff was damaged as a result, and that the defendant's acts
"have the potential for repetition." 54 Inducement refers to inducement of
the individual as a member of the public. The potential for repetition must
be real. 55 This interpretation of these two elements insures an effective
bar to those acts that result from an isolated transaction, thereby insuring
that the purpose of the Act is effectuated.
In Anhold v. Daniels,56 the court held that the Consumer Protection
Act was violated by the false representations that induced the plaintiff
into a joint venture. In evaluating this claim the court stated "that in order
for a private individual to bring an action under RCW 19.86, the conduct
complained of must: (1) be unfair or deceptive; 57 (2) be within the sphere
of trade or commerce; 58 and (3) impact the public interest." 59 The court
went on to elaborate on the public interest requirement by stating that the
public interest was composed of the elements of (1) inducement, (2) dam-
age resulting, and (3) potential for repetition. 60
court may establish the public interest through judicial declaration there by adding the CPA to its
enforcement mechanisms.
52. Haner v. Quincy Farm Chemical, Inc., 97 Wn. 2d 753. 649 P.2d 828 (1982).
53. For an example of a mistaken application of a judicial declaration under Salois, see Com-
ment, Real Estate Broker's Dur., supra note 31, at 115 (1981); cf. Sato v. Century 21. 101 Wn. 2d
599, 681 P.2d 242 (1984).
54. Anhold, 94Wn. 2dat46,614P.2dat 188.
55. Eastlake Const. Co. v. Hess, 102 Wn. 2d 30, 52, 686 P.2d 465, 477 (1984).
56. 94Wn.2d40,614P.2d 184(1980).
57. In Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 100 Wn. 2d 581, 675 P.2d 193 (1983), the court
elaborated on the unfair and deceptive requirements. The court said "(flor conduct to be unfair or
deceptive it is not necessary that an intent to deceive be shown, so long as the action has the capacity
to deceive a substantial portion of the public." Id. at 592, 675 P.2d at 200-01.
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.010(2) (1984) provides that: - 'Trade' and 'commerce' shall
include the sale of assets or services, and any commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of
the state of Washington." See Short and Cressman v. Demopolis, No. 49617-0 (Wash. Nov. 6,
1984) (entrepeneurial aspects of the practice of law are covered by the definition of "trade or com-
merce").
59. Anhold. 94 Wn. 2d at 45,614 P.2d at 188.
60. See supra note 7. For other cases in which the Supreme Court has utilized the public interest
206
Vol. 60:201, 1984
Washington Consumer Protection Act
The definition of public interest provided in Anhold has become central
to the supreme court's analysis of the Consumer Protection Act. The An-
hold test covers transactions in which no illegal practices are alleged 61 as
well as those transactions in which illegal acts are present but the applica-
ble statute lacks a legislative declaration of public policy. 62 Moreover, it
provides assurance that the public interest is impacted.
This fact was highlighted in the recent case of Eastlake Construction v.
Hess,63 in which the court characterized the purpose of the public interest
requirement as the exclusion of actions arising from a single transaction
while allowing a cause of action for acts that arise from a "generalized
course of conduct.' '64 The court limited the inducement element to those
actions that "concern direct or indirect solicitation of the consuming pub-
lic. "65 To insure that the public interest was not compromised, however,
the court hinted thai a pattern of deceptive practices would establish the
element of inducement. 66 The court further insured that the public interest
was present by requiring that there "be shown a real and substantial po-
tential for repetition." 67 It is apparent that the court will tailor the appli-
cation of the public interest test to reflect the underlying purpose of the
Act. Therefore, lower courts should be certain that the acts in question
constitute a course of conduct and not an individual act resulting only in a
private wrong.
DavidJ. Dove
test of Anhold, see Eastlake Const. v. Hess, 102 Wn. 2d 30, 686 P.2d 465 (1984); Sato v. Century
21, 101 Wn. 2d 599, 681 P.2d 242 (1984); Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 100 Wn. 2d 581,
675 P.2d 193 (1983); Haner v. Quincy Farm Chem., Inc., 97 Wn. 2d 753, 649 P.2d 828 (1982).
61. See, e.g., Anhold v. Daniels, 94 Wn. 2d 40, 614 P.2d 184 (1982).
62. Haner v. Quincy Farms Chem., Inc., 97 Wn. 2d 753, 649 P.2d 828 (1982).
63. 102 Wn. 2d 30, 686 P.2d 465 (1984).
64. Id. at51, 686 P.2d at 476.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 52, 686 P.2d at 477 ("Courts should not readily find an absence of inducement to act in
cases where evidence is presented of a pattern of deceptive practices.").
67. Id.
207
